Human Ethology Bulletin, Vol.
12, 3, Sept. 1997, 3-5.
Some evolutionists suggest an inclusive fitness, ‘kin-selection’
approach to explain racism. Since we share more genes with individuals of our
own race than with those of other races, we supposedly increase our own
inclusive fitness by favouring same-raced individuals over others. Therefore,
in our evolutionary past, a gene causing us to favour people of our own race
spread in the human population.
If I am not mistaken, several evolutionists are for various reasons not
satisfied with this explanation. Furthermore, the explanation has generated
remarkably few, if any, new and interesting hypotheses about racism. What other
theories of racism are available? Do they perhaps provide additional hypotheses
on the subject, and are these theories compatible with evolutionary theory? I
would like to present a concise explanation of racism that is not based on the
idea of kin selection, but on the logic of group formation (Roes, 1989).
To be sure, people of a given race often have friends of the same race.
Likewise, generally speaking, rich people have rich friends, artists meet
artists, popular children don’t play with unpopular ones, truck drivers help
other truck drivers, Catholics marry Catholics, the old stick together, etc. It
should be clear that ‘like prefers like’ cannot always be explained by kin
selection.
I want to point out that the following explanation (which is an
application of Mancur Olson’s theory of groups to the subject of racism) is
quite compatible with evolutionary theory, for it assumes that individuals
behave so as to maximize their personal gain, which is easily deduced from the
assumption that we behave so as to maximize our reproductive success or inclusive
fitness.
(1). Groups usually strive for homogeneity and for control of the number of their own members.
Within societies, coalitions of individuals or groups strive for goals.
(Actually, groups don’t strive for anything, but their active members and
leaders do.) The economist Olson argues that groups never primarily aim at
achieving more wealth or more well-being for the society as a whole but,
rather, strive to redistribute the existing wealth of the society to benefit
their own members. Groups compete with one another for a larger share of the
societal pie, and a larger slice for one group usually means smaller slices for
other groups, - or, at least, it is often perceived that way by members of
different groups.
Compare a group composed of a businessman, a housewife and a taxi driver
with a group composed solely of taxi drivers. It seems obvious that there will
be fewer conflicts of interest within the latter group about how the existing
societal wealth should be redistributed, because the members of this taxi
driver group have similar interests and needs. For that reason homogeneous
groups are likely to be unanimous and thus more successful than heterogeneous
groups, and groups therefore strive for uniform, homogeneous memberships. (I
will continue to quickly jump to conclusions, but you will find extensive
argumentations in Olson’s impressive work).
(2). Furthermore, groups often strive to reduce or at least control the number of members of their own group.
With a given slice of the societal pie, more members implies that each
member will get less. Successful groups like ruling classes or castes probably
always were quite concerned with controlling the numbers of their own members.
One method frequently employed to meet this problem is unilateral descent, that
is, only the offspring of one sex belong to the privileged group. Another
method is endogamy: You are expected only to marry within the own group. It is
interesting to note that the European nobility used a ‘biological’ –sounding
justification for this last method: The noble ‘blue blood’ should not be mixed
with other blood.
(3). Stable traits are more suitable than variable ones.
Given that groups strive for homogeneity (that is, similar traits in
members are preferred), do some traits promise more success for a group than
other traits do? Imagine, for the sake of the argument, that the defining trait
is ‘long hair’. A problem with such a trait which can easily be varied is that
once the group has become clearly successful, it will soon be invaded by lots
of other people who got the clever idea of growing their hair. So stable traits
are more suited than variable and fluctuating ones. Sex is a stable trait, and
in every society groups of one sex prevent individuals of the other from
occupying certain professions, exercising certain rights, etc. Race is a trait
even more suited than sex for coalition formation because, combined with
endogamy, the trait will be preserved for many generations. Given a stable
distribution of races within a society, a nation-wide group or coalition based
on race simply cannot grow too fast. So the stability of racial traits is a
major reason why humans tend to organize themselves in racial interest groups.
And, of course, interest groups are often antagonistic.
A racial trait such as skin colour seems a rather trivial thing for the
foundation of groups and coalitions that may divide societies. But imagine that
the group formation process, defined by race, somehow gets started (for
instance because one population is conquered by another, as in South Africa),
and one group is differentially successful. Then soon the racial trait will be
associated with many other traits: Different incomes, education, lifestyles,
etc. These traits in turn may be used to justify differential treatment of
individuals of different races. In other words, group formation based on race
will become a self-reinforcing process. A racist attitude, which seems to be a
virtually inevitable outcome of a group formation process based on race, also
strengthens this process, because racism eliminates possibilities outside of
one’s own racial group, thus strengthening the grip of racial coalitions on
their own members.
“Unfortunately, the promotion of prejudices about race, ethnicity,
culture, and intergroup differences in lifestyle will (…) make the coalition
work better. The inculcation of these prejudices will increase the probability
that the members will follow the rule of endogamy and strengthen selective
incentives by interacting socially only with their own group members, of their
own accord.” (Olson, 1982: 160).
So racism breeds further racism, and there may even be a retaliatory
aspect: If a person of race A treats another of race B unfavourably because of
race, retaliation is likely.
(4). Small numbers are more suited than larger ones.
Olson argues that, other things being equal, small groups are more
successful than larger groups. A major reason why this should be so is that in
small groups it is easier to detect and punish ‘free riders’, that is, people
who selfishly profit from what the group has achieved for its members, but who
do not help in achieving these goals.
Applied to the subject of race, the prediction would be that racial
minorities are generally better organized than racial majorities, and therefore
tend to get a larger slice of the societal pie, which in turn may lead to
hostile reactions from the majority. It is not difficult to point at minorities
who do not fit this prediction. On the other hand, many cases may fit the
predictions – this is for historians to judge. The powerful and Wealthy Tutsi
minority clashing with the Hutu majority in Rwanda seems to provide a recent
example.
If Olson’s theory of groups, applied to racism, is accepted as an
alternative to kin selection theory with regard to explaining racism, it seems
valuable to scrutinize historical, empirical evidence relevant to predictions
of this theory, for instance about the relative organisational capacity of
racial minorities. Some hypotheses (such as those regarding the relative
stability of traits, or the numerical size of minorities) seem in principle
also suited for experimental testing.
References.
Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and
the Theory of Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Olson, M. The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth.
Stagflatioin, and Social Rigidities. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Roes, F.L. (1989). Minderheid en Meerderheid. Tijdschrift voor Sociale Wetenschappen. 34:51-55.